Embedded Files
Volume 3 | Issue 7
Article by Simon Mackley. Edited by Liz Goodwin. Additional research by Liz Goodwin.
On 18 November 2003, Section 28, the infamous prohibition on the promotion of homosexuality by schools and local authorities, was repealed across England and Wales. Section 28, with its explicit attack on the validity of same-sex relationships, had become a totemic issue for gay activists, and its repeal was seen as a landmark victory for gay rights in Britain. The repeal was also seen as a victory for the modernising agenda of New Labour and Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, the Labour Party’s journey towards repealing Section 28 was not as straight forward as it initially appears: as this article demonstrates, Labour’s desire to repeal the legislation was continually matched by a nervousness of doing so, with the result that even at the final moment of victory, the case was unintentionally conceded for the legitimacy of anti gay politics in Britain.
Section 28 was a 1988 amendment to local government law designed to halt the alleged indoctrination of schoolchildren by gay activists. The measure, which was initially proposed by backbench Conservative MPs but was officially endorsed by the Thatcher government, was comprised of two main parts. The first section ordered that local authorities must not ‘intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality.’ The clause then further stated that no local authority could ‘promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship.’ This latter section was to prove particularly offensive to the gay community, as it was seen as enshrining in law the principle of inequality, and the repeal of Section 28 quickly became a rallying goal for the gay rights movement in Britain.
From the outset, the Labour Party signalled its opposition to Section 28. When the measure was brought before the House of Commons in late 1987, the Labour frontbencher Jack Cunningham declared that it raised ‘fundamental issues of personal liberty and civil rights’. Comparing the discrimination faced by homosexuals with that faced by Jews and immigrants, Cunningham attacked the measure as one which would undermine the civil rights of gay men and women, and cause immense psychological damage to young people whose teachers would be legally barred from offering them support over issues of sexuality. Labour MPs overwhelmingly voted against the measure and at the 1992 general election the party included in its manifesto an explicit commitment to repeal Section 28.
However, between Labour’s defeat in 1992 and its landslide victory in 1997, this pledge to remove Section 28 seemed to fade from view. Whereas Neil Kinnock had, in 1992, pledged his party’s support for the repeal effort, Tony Blair’s manifesto at the 1997 election made no such promise. Neither Section 28, nor indeed any other reference to gay rights, was included in the manifesto; instead, the document merely noted that attitudes towards sexuality had ‘changed fundamentally’, as part of a wider section pledging to ‘strengthen family life’. If Labour did still oppose Section 28, it would seem that they didn’t voice their opposition too loudly.
A number of different factors probably led Labour to downplay the issue of Section 28, but a critical element is likely to paradoxically have been the party’s own drive to modernise itself. Much of the gay activism of the 1980s had been closely associated with the more radical elements within the Labour Party: indeed, when Section 28 was first introduced its supporters had aimed it party as an attack upon the ‘loony Left’ Labour-run local authorities which had taken very public stances against homophobia. Given that the purpose of the New Labour brand was to distance itself from such perceptions of the party, it seems likely that Labour were wary of harming their election chances by raising Section 28 as an issue. Thus, even though the 1997 election brought a new parliament dominated by progressive-minded MPs, it was far from clear whether the repeal of Section 28 would actually materialise.
Nonetheless, at the turn of the millennium, the issue of Section 28 dramatically exploded back on to the political stage. After the government had indicated that its forthcoming Local Government Bill was to include a repeal of Section 28, a major political row broke out within the Conservative opposition, culminating in the dramatic defection of the senior spokesman Shaun Woodward to Labour in protest at the Tories’ continued support for Section 28. Despite the initial momentum this political coup gave the government, however, the effort to repeal Section 28 quickly ran into difficulty. The government was soon forced to concede a free vote on the issue, meaning that Labour MPs could vote to keep Section 28 if they wished to. The repeal measure then ran into serious opposition in the House of Lords, where the Conservative and Crossbench majority united with traditionalists on the Left to repeatedly vote down the proposal. Not wanting the political battle to drag on into an election year, the repeal measure was dropped. In Scotland, a similar measure in the newly-created Scottish Parliament proved more successful, but in England and Wales the situation remained unchanged. Again it seemed that a desire to appear centrist and moderate had trumped Labour’s wish to repeal Section 28.
At the 2001 election, the Labour Party’s nervousness over the issue was again apparent. Once again, its manifesto contained no commitment to the repeal of Section 28: instead, it pledged that the promotion of ‘particular lifestyles’ in schools would remain prohibited, albeit while also committing to remove discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. The language suggested the reform rather than repeal of Section 28, and was criticised by the gay rights group Stonewall as an attempt by Labour to ‘fudge around’ the issue. As in 1997, Labour appeared unwilling to make a commitment which it feared would antagonise potential Conservative-leaning voters. Nonetheless, despite its ambivalence at the election, in 2003 the government once again attempted to repeal Section 28, and this time it was successful: the House of Commons approved the repeal by an enormous margin, and this time the House of Lords did not dare to reject it. After six years in government, Labour had finally secured the repeal of Section 28.
Yet the repeal was not without a price. As with its first repeal attempt, Labour had once again conceded a free vote on the issue, with the Labour leadership accepting the argument put forward by the Conservatives that the question of Section 28’s repeal was a matter for the individual conscience and not an area for party politics, an argument which prompted the Labour MP David Cairns to complain that they ‘would not dream of allowing a free vote on issues of race discrimination or gender discrimination.’ The free vote perpetuated the notion that opposition to gay equality was justifiable on the grounds of personal belief, with the result that it granted it a legitimacy that earlier party politics had denied it.
Ultimately, the repeal of Section 28 was an undeniable victory for the gay rights movement in Britain, both in its practical results and in terms of what is symbolised. It was a victory for the Labour Party too, marking the culmination of a fifteen year campaign by the party in favour of repeal. However, the party’s inherent nervousness over the issues undoubtedly prolonged the repeal effort, and the concession of the free vote may yet prove to be a bitter legacy for the gay rights movement.
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