Guilty man?

Article by Marie Stirling. Edited by Ciara West. Additional Research by Liz Goodwin.

Popular opinion has little time for Neville Chamberlain. Coward, appeaser and general incompetent are some of the milder terms which have become synonymous with the former Prime Minister.

I intend to examine how this image was conjured up by both historians and his contemporaries in the years after the Second World War. His critics focused on Chamberlain’s controversial policy of appeasement arguing that this, far from preventing war made it more likely. That is not to say that Chamberlain has not been completely abandoned by historians, with revisionists such as AJP Taylor leading the charge in the 1960s to clear his name. However the condemnation of Chamberlain has continued and popular opinion shows little sign of changing.

Arguably Neville Chamberlain’s reputation, due to the events of the war, was inevitable. The failure of his policy of appeasement and the resulting conflict made him an easy political target. Churchill wrote in 1946, “There was never a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action... it could have been prevented... but no one would listen”.

This view was enforced by contemporary left wing journalists, Michael Foot, Peter Howard, and Frank Owen, who published a tract in 1940 under the title ‘Guilty men’ and continued by historians after the Second World War. Martin Gilbert, who compiled a Winston Churchill biography, enforced Churchill’s hero status, provided a damning contrast with Chamberlain. To compliment this Hans Morgenthau wrote, ‘appeasement is a corrupted policy of compromise’.

This negative view of Chamberlain’s time in office was challenged in the 1960s and 1970s with the arrival of the revisionists. The old assumptions were first challenged by AJP Taylor in his book ‘The Origins of the Second World War’. Taylor’s book controversially claimed that the appeasers were ‘morally right’ to allow German expansion into Czechoslovakia. He justified the Munich agreement as it allowed for self determination for the Germans in the Sudetenland. He described it as ‘a triumph for all that was best and enlightened in British life’. He further supported the policy of appeasement as a sound policy for its time.

He was followed by other revisionists particularly after the 1967 Public Records Act, which released crucial documents for proper examination of the evidence. David Dilke, especially portrayed Chamberlain as a strong and moral leader caught in an impossible situation. Dilke’s view has been supported by some modern historians. The economic historian Paul Kennedy argued that appeasement fitted with the traditional British policy of a European balance of power, as a strong Germany could counter

Bolshevism from spreading in Europe. Others, such as R.A.C. Parker have focused on Britain’s weakness at the time, meaning that appeasement was the only choice as Britain did not have the economic strength to counter Germany. In particular, he focused on the effect of the steady decline of her industries and the effect of the world depression. This also had a detrimental effect on the military whose spending had been sharply reduced after 1919, leaving Britain with a very low military capability. More recently Norman Ripsman and Jack Levy have argued that appeasement gave Britain the time to rearm, her military situation had severely improved by the allocation of one billion pounds to the budget for the next three years and the introduction of conscription in April 1939.

Finally, popular opinion at the time has led historians such as P.M.H. Bell to suggest that appeasement was the only political option. Until 1938, there were many popular pacifist groups present in Britain, such as The Peace Pledge Union, evidence of an anti-war attitude within the public consciousness possibly influenced in part by the losses incurred during the First World War.

Other historians, in defence of Chamberlain, have stressed that appeasement was not a new policy. Further the policy had even been praised for bringing order and peace to Europe from 1918- 1933.

Yet the Chamberlain rescue mission has not been widely accepted by either historians or by popular opinion. Roger Eatwell has argued that the Munich agreement was not popular in Britain, suggesting Chamberlain was not forced into his appeasement policy. He notes that the Tories suffered badly in October- November 1938 polls over foreign policy.

There has also been criticism of Chamberlain’s policy after the declaration of war; Clive Ponting argued that ‘Chamberlain’s incompetent direction of the war let Hitler conquer Denmark and Norway’. Keith Middlemas has criticised Chamberlain for his aggressive control of foreign policy, so blaming him for the disasters which occurred. It should also be noted that while the revisionists sympathise with Chamberlain, it is not unconditional. Even Taylor was willing to admit that appeasement was part of a long line of ‘accidents’ and Chamberlain was in some cases misguided. As for public opinion, Chamberlain is still not viewed in a positive light, while Winston Churchill was crowned in 2002 as the Greatest Ever Briton.

Therefore despite attempts to rescue Chamberlain’s regime it seems that it will never be totally excused by historians, while the negative public image for the most part remains. It seems that Chamberlain will be confined to history as one of its ‘losers’. The negative comparison to Winston Churchill is one that is too easy to make. Further the public’s conscious memory regarding the atrocities in World War Two make the job of changing that view a much harder task.

*****

“In spite of the hardness and ruthlessness of his face, I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon.”

Chamberlain on Hitler.

“Chamberlain’s three rounds with Hitler must qualify as one of the most degrading capitulations in history.”

Historian Norman Davies.

“England has been offered a choice between war and shame. She has chosen shame, and will get war.” 

Winston Churchill on the Munich Agreement.

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