Ernst Röhm

Article by Sarah Marriott. Edited by Rose Colville. Additional Research by Michelle Brien. 

This year marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ – the event that illustrated that no-one was safe in Nazi Germany. It saw the arrest and execution of most of the high-ranking members of the Sturmabteilung (SA), the Nazi militia, as well as many of Hitler’s other opponents. 

The SA and their leader, Ernst Röhm, had created chaos in Germany to emphasise the weaknesses of the Weimar Government and demonstrate the point that only a firm ruler like Hitler could aid Germany’s recovery from the depression and social upheaval. It worked until the NSDAP gained the majority in the Reichstag and the violence did not stop. Röhm even actively encouraged the continuation of the aggression, even though it was resulting in innocent casualties. Tensions between the NSDAP and Röhm’s SA increased steadily until the arrests on 30th June 1934. 

What was the catalyst for Hitler’s decision to take action? Officially it was because only days before evidence had been found implicating Röhm and high-level SA officials, as well as other alleged co-conspirators, in a plot to overthrow the government. June 30th saw the climax of the investigation with the arrests of the aforementioned. 

However official reports rarely give a full account of the event and the account given has several inconsistencies. Not only were the’co-conspirators’ Hitler’s last serious opponents for power, but they had little to do with Röhm or the SA – in fact most actively disliked them. This is not definitive enough to discredit it, but surviving records indicate that the evidence used was actually fabricated by Himmler and his deputy Heydrich. So what was the real reason? Röhm presented both an embarrassment and a threat to Hitler. Historians usually emphasise the latter factor as the central reason, but how accurate is this approach?

Hitler’s order to create evidence against Röhm did not follow any investigation looking for genuine evidence against the SA and others. This indicates that the ‘real’ evidence was non-existent or unavailable. It is unlikely that it would have been unavailable as, with Hitler’s support, the clearance would have been high. If, therefore, there was no evidence, the implication is that there was no plot. Without a plot, was Röhm really a threat? 

He had the potential to be such. In 1934 the German Army (Wehrmacht) numbered only 100,000 due to the Versailles limitations whereas the SA exceeded 4 million members. The numeric advantage as well as Röhm’s ambition to become Minister of Defence made the Wehrmacht’s leader, Blomberg, anxious. When considering the aggressive nature of the SA and their grievances perhaps they really were a serious threat. However even after months of such tensions there seems to be no evidence of Röhm taking aggressive action, which implies he was only a potential threat, not an actual one. 

Hitler was being caused serious public embarrassment by many of the activities of the SA. Not only had the violence continued post-1933, but it had gotten so bad that even the foreign office were complaining of aggression against foreign diplomats. Röhm even encouraged it, portraying defiant disunity at a time when the World’s eyes were watching Germany. This was made worse by Röhm’s comments about his SA’s superiority over the Wehrmacht, which alienated Hitler’s needed conservative supporters. Hitler forced Röhm to sign agreements proclaiming that his SA were the inferior, but this only led to insulting comments from Röhm. Obviously this was extremely embarrassing. 

Röhm and most of the SA shared socialist leanings which they made well-known. They had believed that Hitler’s ascension would lead to a socialist revolution, and felt betrayed when it did not. These views, coupled with the might of the SA, threatened the conservative capitalists who were the backbone of Hitler’s supporters. Again, Röhm refused to yield to the NSDAP and his defiance implied Hitler’s loss of control over the party. 

On perhaps a lesser note, yet still an important factor, Röhm’s semi-public homosexual affairs also suggested hypocrisy within the NSDAP especially due to the vehemence of the party’s view on the topic. It does seem unlikely that this was a large factor though. 

Clearly Röhm was causing serious problems for the NSDAP’s image, which were (probably unintentionally) causing Hitler an indirect threat. Their activities angered the conservative President Hindenburg, who was potentially Hitler’s biggest danger due to his superior power and control of the Wehrmacht. When Blomberg told Hitler that Hindenburg was going to give him an ultimatum – get rid of Röhm or martial law would be implemented and the NSDAP would lose everything. Hitler, evidently, had no choice. 

However the threat here was not the SA, it was Hindenburg. Can we attribute any of the blame to the SA? Yes, of course, their actions were purposeful and done with the knowledge that they were causing offence. They knew that they were contradicting the party line and making themselves into targets for resentment and dislike. These were the actions that affronted Hindenburg so much, not their potential to revolt against Hitler. Therefore it was the unorthodox attitudes and violent tendencies of the SA which indirectly threatened Hitler – not the risk of a putsch. This conclusion is not surprising because, however strong the SA might have appeared, at that point in time they were not Hitler’s adversaries. They were simply foolish enough, or brave enough to anger those more crucial to Hitler’s plan than themselves.

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