Euroscepticism 

Article by Sam Wakeford. Edited by Rose Colville. Additional Research by Robyn Hall. 

Addressing the media at a press conference in January 1963, French President Charles De Gaulle outlined the following reasons for his refusal to accept Harold MacMillan’s application for Britain to join the European Economic Community (EEC). 

‘Britain is an insular, maritime nation, bound up by its trade, markets and food supplies with the most varied and often the most distant countries. She has, in all her work, very special, very original, habits and traditions. In short, the nature and structural circumstances peculiar to England are very different from those of other continentals.’ 

Four years later, Harold Wilson was given another categorical ‘non’ by De Gaulle before finally, in 1973, Ted Heath’s government successfully took Britain into the Common Market for the first time. Thus, from analysing the course of events between 1963 and 1967, it is hardly surprising that Britain’s relationship with the European Union has often been and continues to be a testing one, fraught with disagreement over questions, such as those involving the pooling of national sovereignty, and undermined by a basic lack of trust between state and institution. In this article, we will therefore need to ascertain what fundamental factors have shaped the perception of British Eurosceptism, in turn questioning the validity of these factors at hand while finally reasoning what the future might hold for Britain and her relationship with the European Union in the years to come. 

The Origins of British Euroscepticism 

As the many children who were forced to appreciate the red sections on the world map in their school geography classes can testify, Britain was the world’s greatest imperial power throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Indeed, at its greatest extent following the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the British Empire spanned an incredible 13,000,000 miles, an area encompassing a quarter of the world’s population. Understandably, therefore, Europe was not a consideration that was ever at the forefront of British policymaking, demonstrated by the fact the Treaty of Locarno (1925) was Britain’s first security guarantee in Europe for over a century. Empire however was far more than a territorialmass; it was a core component of an identity arguably unique from that seen on ‘the continent’. Jingoism and imperial pride were seen everywhere in British popular culture from cigarette cards to ethnic shows while even today Delhi is gearing up to host the 18th Commonwealth games in 2010. In addition to this imperial dimension, British identity collectively represented, and continues to represent, the national identities of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This point is well illustrated in Orwell’s peerless essay ‘The Lion and the Unicorn’ in which he presents a picture of the English nation where ‘the beer is bitterer, the coins are heavier, the grass is greener and the advertisements are more blatant’, a nation Orwell perceives ‘few Europeans could endure living in’ and a picture that reinforces the idea of ‘Britishness’ being an identity separate from that seen in Europe. 

However, while this notion of British ‘otherness’ was plain enough for Orwell and De Gaulle to see, it is arguably more significant that this perception has had such a lasting effect that still lives with us to present. It leads us to question why the special relationship is something politically unique to Britain and America (alone) or why binge drinking, a general social problem, has now been dubbed ‘the British disease?’ Thus, having examined the unique imperial and national dimensions entwined in British identity as possible origins of British Euroscepticism, let us now turn our attentions to some of the other factors that have fuelled British Euroscepticism. 

Why is Britain Eurosceptic? 

Britain’s late entry into the Common Market was unequivocally a source of national embarrassment and resentment that has, and continues to permeate, the national press, political parties and public. The result has been a continued hostility towards the idea of a collective European institution that has lived long in the British memory and that is still clear for all to see today. For example, only two years after joining the Common Market, 40% of the British public voted to leave in the 1975 referendum, while moving into the 1990s, Major worked tirelessly to secure Britain opted out of the Social Chapter (1992) and Working Times Directive (1993). British political parties have also struggled to come to terms with Europe, resulting in a confusion and distrust that has and continues to be transmitted via the press to the public. Seen in its early years as a ‘capitalist club’ by the left and an unwelcome distraction from national self-interests by the right, UK political parties have constantly been at odds with themselves and one another over the issue of Europe. Indeed, Europe was to account for Thatcher’s political demise, while today the Liberal Democrats are the only major UK party to have consistently held a pro Europe position. Thus it unsurprising that party attitudes of confusion and suspicion towards Europe have too been reflected in the media and wider public opinion. For example, the Sun’s November 1st headline of 1990 read ‘Up yours Delors’ in response to Delors’ attempt to commit Britain to signing the Maastrict Treaty (1992) while only in last year’s European election, Britain recorded a national low 34% turn out. 

Is British Euroscepticism justified and what might the future hold? 

Finally, it is left for us to consider how justified British Euroscepticism is and what the future might hold. At the heart of this debate lies the question of how much, if any, of a nation’s sovereignty should be pooled from a unitary state to a federal institution. Taking a British Eurosceptic stance, no national sovereignty should be devolved to any institution or state, least of all one that has no sovereignty of its own and whose institutions have been plagued by corruption (the Santer Commission) and lack sufficient authority (the European Parliament has no primary legislative powers). Further, as one of the EU’s largest net contributors, Britain receives little in return. For example, Britain’s small agricultural sector means she reaps little reward from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) despite it accounting for 40% of the whole EU budget. On the other hand, however, the EU has undoubtedly had some positive impact on Britain in recent years. Arguably the greatest of these has been access to the world’s largest single market as part of the Single European Act (1986), removing physical, fiscal and technical barriers to trade and permitting the movement of goods, services, labour and capital freely. Thus, while Britain has doubtless gained less than others from EU membership, the question remains whether this is good enough reason to endorse Euroscepticism. 

On this note, let us conclude by contemplating what the future might hold for Britain and her relationship with the European Union. Judging by the results of the 2009 European Election, the future looks bleak with a European record low 43% turn out in comparison to 63% in 1979. This pessimistic outlook is further supported by the problems encountered in ratifying the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the unprecedented success enjoyed by both UKIP and the BNP in last year’s election. Much will therefore depend on the impact the Lisbon Treaty (2009) has in supposedly ‘democratising’ the EU (less data protection and the Citizen’s Right Initiative, etc) and the implications of future enlargement (how will a British society shaken by 7/7 react to the possibility of 80 million Turkish Muslims joining the EU?) though skeptics may well question, and with good reason, whether it is all too late?

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