US Intervention in Vietnam

Volume 1 | Issue 6 - Open Theme

Article by Tom Casey. Edited by Helen Doherty. Additional Research by Helen Midgley. 

American involvement in Vietnam cost the lives of over 50,000 American troops and over 3 million Vietnamese deaths it has also been described by Norman Podhoretz as ‘perhaps the most negatively charged symbol in American history.’ This quotation aptly reflects the pathos many Americans associate with their involvement in Vietnam as the death toll, combined with intense journalistic coverage; the failure to meet military objectives; and immoral treatment of civilians, ingrained a sense of embarrassment and humiliation within the American psyche. It is therefore of little surprise that many commentators have sought to gain answers to questions and have sought to analyse the role played by those in positions of authority, the tactics used and the issue with which this article is primarily concerned relating to American involvement. Why it was American troops were sent 8,000 miles to fight on another continent, where there was no direct threat to American security? 

Vietnam was a conflict which lasted from 1954 until 1975 with differing degrees of US involvement ranging from discreet financial measures, used during the French occupation of Indochina (an area which refers to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) which ended following the Battle at Diem Bien Phu and the resulting Geneva Conference in 1954, to the direct use of military force. This more hands on approach being characterised under the Lyndon B. Johnson presidency under which US involvement intensified in an attempt to win the campaign. 

The war in Vietnam has become a hallmark warning against the invasion of foreign countries in the modern era and has been used in recent debates in relation to the war in Iraq. The war in Vietnam has become associated with many images, events and fierce debates. 

The war in Vietnam is famous as the first war in which journalists came up close and personal with the troops and subsequently provided live coverage of proceedings. Vietnam has also become synonymous with graphic war photography, the famous example showing a naked Vietnamese child stood in the middle of the road screaming out in pain following a napalm attack; this demonstrated first hand the horrors of warfare and its impact upon innocent civilians. Accompanying such harrowing images, military tragedies like that of the infamous My Lai massacre in 1968, where 347 unarmed civilians were beaten and killed by American soldiers and their officers, added to the intensity and hostility of growing discontent amongst the American public. As a result serious questions began to be asked on the domestic front, which would have seemed only a few years before inconceivable to such a mighty nation. Was victory in such conditions possible against an enemy so well drilled in the art of guerrilla warfare? Much coverage and literature has been dedicated to such issues yet the remainder of this article shall shed light on the compelling debates, which surrounded the controversial subject of US involvement in South East Asia. 

Just as the Chilcot Inquiry is a contemporary example of our own enquiry into our participation in Iraq, there are plenty of cases such as the narrative concerning the origins of the Second World War, which point to the importance we attach to learning the true cause for military involvement. This article will thus detail the varying historiographical interpretations of a country’s motives for war. 

Having studied this topic only very briefly whilst in secondary school, I gained an insight into the chronological order of events and the traditional ideological interpretation of US involvement, whereby Vietnam in this context became a proxy war amidst the much wider communist vs. capitalist debate which encompassed the Cold War years following the end of the Second World War. Incorporated within this explanation is the anti-communist fervour which gripped America 

stemming from the McCarthy witch hunts of the 1950s and the staunch belief in the ‘domino theory’. The latter being the basic belief that communism had a knock on effect upon the surrounding area, a belief reiterated in connection with Vietnam and that it became the major testing ground, as it was proposed that if it fell to communism then so too would the rest of South East Asia. This fear of the domino effect intensified following Mao’s rise to power in China, 1949, as Asia suddenly became a market vulnerable to communism. It is thus, undoubted that ideological differences amongst leading world powers, namely USA and Russia, lay at the foot of the reasoning behind US involvement in Vietnam.

Opposing this further views and ideas surrounding US involvement have perhaps suffered in favour of this ideologically driven interpretation. As the war became increasingly unpopular from the mid 1960s onwards more cynical observers and subsequent historians focused on the economic implications that may have driven US policy makers and the media to perhaps alter information and exacerbate details which may support and justify a readiness to intervene in support of the South Vietnamese. Important to this explanation is the image of Ho Chi Minh the leader of the Viet Cong in North Vietnam. Some believe Ho Chi Minh was unfairly portrayed as a dictatorial communist, likened to the image of Stalin. This undoubtedly undermined Ho who proclaimed to be a nationalist. It has been argued that Ho Chi Minh was wrongly associated with USSR and China, accusations therefore assert that Americans over emphasised links between Vietnam and Russia to earn popular consent for war. 

This economic based interpretation is one used predominantly by Marxist historians who see American involvement as an attempt by the ruling elite in American society to use the negative connotations linking autocracy and communism as an excuse to send military and financial aid to counter Northern Vietnamese communism in order to maintain trade links with South East Asia and in particular the market of Japan. Therefore involvement in this instance sees Vietnam as an example of neo- colonialism with economic interests being covered up by communist jargon. 

Well aware that communism has economic connections and that the ideological analysis has many interlinked features, in that communism vs. capitalism is in itself an economic debate, the true issue is to which approach one adds more emphasis. 

Elaborating upon this left wing interpretation it infers greater scrutiny of leading political figures, with US civilians and commentators left feeling duped into supporting involvement as Presidents and their advisers encountered opposition concerning there influence upon events. The war in Vietnam was a conflict of escalation for each president involved: Truman (1945-53), Eisenhower (1953-61), Kennedy (1961-63), Johnson (1963-69) and Nixon (1969-73) bearing differing degrees of responsibility for the war. Anti-war sentiment seemed to fit in with the questioning of politicians and greater enthusiasm to get to the truth behind intervention. 

There are further debates surrounding this hot topic, but what is important is to understand that no war is simply caused by one single event, long and short term causes play their role, some more than others. Yet what is interesting is how interpretations develop in importance at particular moments in time, as we try and get to the bottom of why lives are put on the line. Also it leaves the question can we learn from previous events? And perhaps question in advance the true motives behind conflict and learn to scrutinise key decisions. As Vietnam shows, along with our own experiences concerning Iraq, perhaps we only start to ask the more probing questions when it is too late.