Mad Dogs and Englishmen 

Article by Michael Jones. Edited by Hannah Lyons. Additional Research by Michelle Brien. 

By 1900 the British Empire encompassed an area of approximately four million square miles and dominated nearly a quarter of the world’s population. Popularity and enthusiasm toward the empire within Britain was related to one’s social standing. By the 1890s, British society was a concrete class-based hierarchy consisting of the elites, namely the aristocracy and landed gentry; the expanding middle class made up of professionals such as doctors and lawyers; the lower middle-class of schoolteachers and minor officials, and the working classes. The traditional view is that the governing and privileged classes were tied most closely to the colonies and that further down the social stratum support for imperialism diminished. More convincing is the view that ‘jingoism’ and ‘popular imperialism’ were expressed by the lower echelons of society, and that opinion was considerably more diverse and complex than straightforward indifference. Approval of the empire was not simply a pursuit of the rich that had to be imposed through garish propaganda upon the masses; there is evidence to suggest that it actually worked against elite interests because its structure meant it was a limited source of employment. 

It is unlikely that the upper class’s vested interest in the empire was to shoulder Kipling’s ‘White man’s burden’. As well as prestige and the egotistical desire to be the envy of all European nations, the empire was vital for providing jobs and a source of wealth for many elites. Many had helplessly watched their estates become unprofitable as a result of cheaper imports from the United States. 

Many had to sell their land whilst domestic markets were no longer able to buy home-grown produce. The colonies provided an alternative source of employment in response to the inexorable shift from a society based on hereditary nobility to a society which attached increasing importance to wealth. Postings as colonial governors and high-ranking officials went some way in financially alleviating the gentry most affected, and were highly sought after because they tended to have long terms of office and were more lucrative than positions such as mayor. However, these seemingly prestigious roles have been likened to a ‘poisoned chalice’ because of the requirement of a private income to meet high living costs. Furthermore, the empire was not large enough to wholly support an inefficient social minority. The abundance of conservatism present amongst the wealthy ensured that many feared change and dreaded the prospect of being pushed from the top of society. 

In contrast, where as the aristocracy was less fortunate with (but stubbornly enthused by) the empire, the middle class was flourishing. It possibly benefitted the most as the nineteenth century came to a close. The empire provided a widening field of employment for an expanding and diversifying professional class. This was particularly valuable to many of the aspiring middle-class, some of whom may have been lacking a sturdy financial base from which to launch a prestigious career in politics, for example. Administrative jobs were much more numerous than governorships, especially, when entry into the Indian Civil Service was established on a purely competitive base from 1853. Business interests were also enthusiastic about the economic possibilities in the colonies; between 1850 and 1914, the empire’s proportion of British exports varied between a quarter and a third, which is a further contrast to the general economic misfortunes of the landed gentry. However, entrepreneurs such as George Cadbury and Joseph Rowntree, both Quakers, held a strong disdain for the empire and what it stood for, Cadbury being a vehement critic of the Boer War. 

It was largely the case that the working classes had little vested interest in the British Empire. It did not create colonial employment for them as this was reserved for the educated, and if anything, opened up the flood gates of cheap colonial labour which undermined the domestic labour market. However, there is evidence to suggest that the masses did show ‘jingoistic’ tendencies, but not as a result of the overtly patriotic culture arguably forced on to them by those in positions of political power. The end of the nineteenth century witnessed a great increase in the quantities of imperial literature, songs, poems, and stage shows. Plays such as ‘Empire of India’ and ‘Greater Britain’ are a token example of the overtly patriotic music hall entertainment available primarily to the working classes. The printing of novels such as ‘With Clive in India’ and ‘With Butler in Natal’ suggest on the one hand that there was a receptive audience for such material, but on the other, holds connotations of wavering working-class support at the end of nineteenth century, a problem seen by the upper classes as in need of a remedy in the form of artificial ‘jingoism’. The working classes were happy to support their nation in times of war, filling the ranks of the army fighting in the colonies, and the produce imported from colonial markets was well received by many working men and women. 

Therefore, the British Empire was largely popular with society at the end of the nineteenth century. The upper classes were ardent supporters of the conservative and elitist administration, which provided prestige and employment for a fortunate minority, but it also opened up foreign competition that undermined traditional estate produce. The middle classes on the other hand experienced an empire of opportunity and economic prosperity, with businessmen climbing the ladder of success and embracing the opportunities of imperialism; an empire of merit. This suggests a paradoxical situation in which the elites were the most supportive of the empire, but it was the middle classes who benefitted to the greater extent. The working classes were “jingoistic” when the situation demanded, but did not respond to overt propaganda; many would not have hardly ventured outside their villages, let alone been involved with the empire. It is relatively safe to assume that imperial enthusiasm at the end of the nineteenth century was greater than it ever had, or ever would be again.

← Back to Volume 1

← Back to Issue 3