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Volume 3 | Issue 6 - War & Peace
Article by Stephen Woodward. Edited by Simon Mackley.
The 1920s are often touted as a successful period for the League of Nations, when compared with the more turbulent 1930s. The handling of minor disputes that arose in this period is frequently said to be proof of the organisation’s initial success in settling international disputes through negotiation and arbitration. Yet as an avid student of Greek history this has always perplexed me.
Greece was frequently treated unfairly by the League of Nations, financially punished for the actions of others and plagued by contradictory rulings from the organisation. The League even contradicted its own rulings, punishing Greece both when it was at the receiving end of aggression and when it was an aggressor in much the same situation.
In 1923 Mussolini’s Italy invaded the Greek island of Corfu. Having shelled the island, Italian troops invaded killing at least fifteen citizens. This action came about following the death of an Italian General and his three assistants who were mapping the Greek-Albanian border. The Greek government claimed that this was the work of bandits, notorious for operating in the area. Mussolini, unsatisfied at this explanation, demanded 50 million Lire in compensation. When the Greek government refused to pay up Italy occupied Corfu to try and force the issue. This of course had nothing to do with Mussolini’s imperial aims or the strategic position of Corfu at the foot of the Adriatic. The result of all of this was that the League found in favour of Italy and demanded that Greece pay up, after which Italian troops were required to leave Corfu. Now this incident alone may seem fair enough. The Italian General had died on Greek soil and the Italian government demanded compensation, even if a full-scale invasion of Greek territory does seem a little rash.
However two years later a similar incident would result in the League yet again finding against Greece. On October 22 1925 a Greek soldier ran after his dog that strayed across the border into Bulgaria. The Bulgarian border patrol shot the Greek soldier and his accompanying Captain. The Greek response, taking precedent from the Italian incident, was to demand six million drachma in compensation and an apology from the Bulgarian government. When neither materialised by the deadline, Greece launched forces into Bulgaria and attempted to seize the border town of Petrich. Bulgarian troops offered little resistance to the Greek advance, though the Greek forces did lose 120 men in clashes with the International Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, an IRA-like guerrilla band backed by the Bulgarian government who for decades had created tensions in the northern regions of Greece. The affair came to be known as the Incident at Petrich or, somewhat more entertainingly, ‘the War of the Stray Dog.’
The Bulgarian government took the issue to the League of Nations. The Greek government clearly stated that it had no ambitions to claim territory in Bulgaria and that Petrich had only been seized as a consequence of Bulgaria refusing to meet the demanded compensation and apology. However the League found in favour of Bulgaria, fining Greece £45,000. The shocking disparity of treatment of Greece in comparison with the actions of the Italian invasion of Corfu is evident, especially when one considers that the entire incident had been stirred up by the Bulgarian murder of an innocent soldier trying to retrieve his errant pet and only escalated after Bulgaria had ignored the Greek proposal to settle the dispute peacefully.
So why did Greece get such a rough deal? The case appears to be that the League and other nations just plumped for the easy options. Both Italy and Bulgaria may have indeed been in the wrong. But to side with Greece on either occasion, as the smaller nation, would have probably have provoked a war. This was undoubtedly the last thing either France or Britain, the two major players in the league, desired. With this reluctance in mind both had also abandoned Greece over the Chanak crisis of 1920, where Greece lost the territory apportioned to her by the Paris Peace Settlements following the resurgence of Turkey under Mustapha Kemal. The best option, the one that avoided war in all of these cases was not the one which was right for Greece; it was the option that suited the more powerful aggressor nations. The League had no ability to force a solution that was ‘right’, so it had to appease the nation more capable of causing a wider disruption to world peace. The League had little power to bring to heel troublesome nations. The 1920s were not then, as is so often peddled at GCSE, a triumph for the League of Nations in preserving the peace, but a case of victory for the bullies. As Benito Mussolini, one such bully, claimed: ‘The league is very well when sparrows shout, but no good at all when eagles fall out.’
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